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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dean Allen Harrell appeals from the district court's order denying his
petition to perform post-conviction DNA testing.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The facts of the underlying criminal case are as set forth by the Idaho
Court of Appeals in State v. Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749, p.1
(Idaho App. July 25, 2001):
On July 30, 1998, a Cassia County sheriff's officer was
dispatched to the residence of S.K. Upon entering the residence,
the officer observed that S.K.'s eyes were black and swollen, that
her lips were puffy, that she had blood on her arms and hands, that
there was blood on the floor, bed, and walls, and that a number of
items in the residence were broken. S.K. told the officer that she
had been beaten and raped.
Harrell was arrested the next day and charged with rape and burglary. !g.
At trial, the state presented the following evidence:
A friend of the victim testified at trial that she, Harrell, and a
number of other people arrived at the victim's home at
approximately 1:30 a.m. on the morning of July 30, 1998. She
testified that Harrell had been wearing a tank top, faded blue
wrangler jeans, scruffy cowboy boots, and a green ball cap.
Finally, the friend testified that Harrell remained at the victim's
home after she and most of the other people left at approximately
3:00 a.m.
Another friend of the victim testified at trial that she returned
to the victim's home and knocked on the front door. She testified
that a man walked out, shut and locked the door behind him, and
said that the victim was asleep. Although she did not notice the
man's face, the friend testified that she knew the man as Harrell
1

because he was wearing the same clothing that she saw him
wearing earlier that night. She further testified that Harrell ran very
quickly to his truck and sped off without turning on his headlights.
Finally, the friend testified that she continued to knock and that
when the victim answered the door, she was "bare naked, bloody,
and beat" and yelling that she had just been raped.
One of the officers testified at trial that he first confronted
Harrell in the parking lot of a local cafe on the following day. Harrell
agreed to talk to the police and led them back to his residence
where Harrell agreed to let the officers look around. The officer
observed that Harrell was wearing a pair of blue Wrangler Jeans
which appeared to be stained with blood. In Harrell's residence,
the officer discovered a pair of lace-up leather boots and a lightcolored tank top which also appeared to be stained with blood.
Harrell admitted that he had been wearing the pants, the lace-up
boots, and the tank top on the previous night. The officer asked if
he could take Harrell's pants for testing, and Harrell agreed. When
Harrell removed his pants, the officer discovered that Harrell's
underwear was also stained with blood. Harrell admitted that he
had worn the underwear on the previous night. Harrell voluntarily
gave his underwear to the officer.
A sample of blood found on Harrell's underwear was DNA
tested by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement. A criminalist
for the department testified at trial that the results of the DNA
testing excluded Harrell as the source of the blood. The criminalist
testified that the results showed, however, that the victim was a
potential source of the blood.
The officer also testified that Harrell agreed to meet the
officers at their office for further questioning. The officer observed
that there were numerous "fresh" scrapes and cuts on Harrell's
hands, which the officer believed were the result of hitting
somebody in the teeth. During the interview, Harrell admitted to
having sex with the victim and stated that "everything was going
good and then it turned to shit." Harrell also stated that he didn't
know how things got out of hand, that he didn't realize that he hit
her that hard, and that he hated going to jail for something he didn't
mean to do. Following the interview, Harrell completed a written
statement in which he stated, "Everything was going good, and the
2

next minute, everything got out of hand, and she started telling me
she didn't want to. She wanted to go to bed, and that is when it got
out of control."
Id. at 3-4. A jury found Harrell guilty of rape but acquitted him of burglary. !Q. at
2. The district court imposed a unified life sentence, with twenty-five years fixed.
Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Harrell's conviction and sentence on
direct appeal.

kl

Harrell then filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that
he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See Harrell v.
State, 2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 405A, p.3 (Idaho App. May 14, 2004). The
district court denied Harrell's petition after an evidentiary hearing, and the Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed. See id.
Harrell then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, again
claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

See Harrell v.

State, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 400, p.1 (Idaho App. March 19, 2008). He
also filed a motion to disqualify the judge presiding over the post-conviction
petition proceedings.

See id.

The trial court summarily dismissed Harrell's

petition on the ground that it was untimely, without first ruling on Harrell's motion
to disqualify. See id. The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal, holding
that the district judge was without authority to dismiss the petition or to take any
other action in the case before first ruling on the motion to disqualify.

kl at 1-3.

In the interim, the motion to disqualify was rendered moot by the death of
the sitting district court judge. See Harrell v. State, 2010 Unpublished Opinion
No. 638, p.2 (Idaho App. September 9, 2010).
3

On remand, the district court

again dismissed Harrell's petition as untimely.
affirmed.

lsL

The Idaho Court of Appeals

lsL at 2-5.

Harrell next filed another post-conviction petition which contained various
allegations and requested additional DNA testing of evidence associated with his
conviction.

(R., pp.14-24.)

The district court appointed counsel to represent

Harrell. (R., p.25.) Appointed counsel filed an amended petition seeking new
DNA testing pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(b). 1 (R., pp.49-93.) The petition included
an affidavit from a biologist explaining that while previous DNA testing on
Harrell's underwear revealed the victim as a possible source of the major DNA
profile, the testing utilized at that time could only identify a DNA profile with a
possible frequency of 1 in 1,900 individuals. (R., p.57.) However, modern short
tandem repeat (STR) DNA analysis could match a forensic sample to a single
individual with a match probability of 1 in quadrillions. (Id.)
The district court denied Harrell's petition.

(R., pp.184-193.) The court

concluded that even assuming that the result of new DNA testing would exclude
the victim as a contributor to the blood found on Harrell's underwear, such
evidence would not show that it was more likely than not that Harrell was
Harrell initially requested DNA testing on "blood found on his underwear, blood
from [his] jeans, rape kit vaginal swabs of victim, pubic hairs which may have
been collected from victim (if any), and fingernail scrapings taken from victim (if
any.)" (R., p.51.) However, after it was discovered that some of this evidence
had been destroyed (R., pp.106-107), the district court construed Harrell's
. subsequent supporting memorandum as narrowing his request to include only
new DNA testing on his underwear, of which the state still retained custody. (R.,
p.190 n.1.)
On appeal, Harrell has not challenged the district court's
interpretation of his request, and has limited his argument to whether Harrell was
entitled to additional DNA testing of his underwear. (See generally Appellant's
brief.)
4
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innocent in light of the other evidence of Harrell's guilt presented at trial.
Harrell timely appealed. (R., pp.205-207.)

5

(Id.)

ISSUE
Harrell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying DNA testing of the blood
stain and summarily dismissing the petition?
(Appellant's brief, p.7.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Harrell failed to show that the district court erred in denying his postconviction petition for DNA testing?

6

ARGUMENT
Harrell Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Dismissing His
Petition For Post-Conviction DNA Testing
A.

Introduction
Harrell contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for

post-conviction DNA testing.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.)

Specifically, Harrell

contends that the district court erred in concluding that the requested DNA
testing did not have the scientific potential to provide evidence that would show
that it was more probable than not that Harrell was innocent of the rape. (Id.)
However, a review of the record supports the district court's ruling. Even if
new DNA testing excluded the victim as a source of the blood found on the
underwear Harrell was wearing the day after the rape, such evidence would have
limited exculpatory value. The mere absence of the victim's DNA on Harrell's
underwear would not point to another perpetrator, conclusively remove Harrell
from the scene of the crime, or overcome strong evidence of Harrell's guilt,
including his confessions.
In addition, the known results of the previous DNA testing performed on
Harrell severely limit the likelihood that any new DNA evidence would even be
exculpatory. In applying I.C. § 19-4902, this Court may consider the likelihood
that any DNA testing would not be favorable to Harrell.

7

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied § 19-4902 And Denied Harrell's PostConviction DNA Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4902 permits an individual to petition for the post-

conviction DNA testing of evidence which was secured in relation to the trial
which resulted in his conviction.

Among other things, I.C. § 19-4902 requires a

petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable
than not that the petitioner is innocent."

I.C. § 19-4902(e)(1).

The Idaho

appellate courts have not yet had the occasion to analyze this materiality
requirement of I.C. § 19-4902
In this case, the district court denied Harrell's petition after correctly
concluding that, in light of the strength of the evidence presented against Harrell
at trial, additional DNA testing on the underwear he was wearing the day after the
rape would not show that it was more probable than not that Harrell was
innocent, even assuming DNA test results excluded the victim as a contributor.
(R., pp.184-193.)

This Court may affirm the district court's denial of Harrell's

petition exclusively on this basis.
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However, the state additionally submits that I.C. § 19-4902 does not
require a court to assume DNA results most favorable to the petitioner in
analyzing a post-conviction DNA testing request.

Instead, the statute permits

district courts to consider the likelihood that DNA testing will produce a result
favorable to a petitioner, especially where, as here, DNA testing had already
been conducted on the evidence in question. Harrell failed to show a reasonable
probability that any new DNA testing would have been exculpatory, and thus,
failed to show that it was more probably than not that he was innocent. This
Court may affirm the district court's denial of Harrell's petition on this alternative
basis.

1.

Harrell Has Failed To Establish That Favorable DNA Test
Results Would Have Shown That It Was More Likely Than
Not He Is Innocent Of The Rape

As discussed above, the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902 requires
a petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable
than not that the petitioner is innocent."
In analyzing whether Harrell made the materiality showing required by I.C.
§ 19-4902 in this case, the district court weighed the evidence of Harrell's guilt

presented at trial, and the potential exculpatory value of the DNA testing results,
assuming results favorable to Harrell.

(R., pp.184-193.)

The court first

recognized that DNA test results favorable to Harrell could only reveal the

absence of the victim's DNA on his underwear. (R., pp.184-193.) This type of
9

result would be of limited exculpatory value because it would not point to an
alternative perpetrator or remove Harrell from the scene of the crime.
The court then reviewed the evidence presented against Harrell at trial.
(Id.) At trial, a video of Detective Randy Kidd's interview with Harrell was entered
into evidence

(#25985 Trial Tr.,2 p.97, L.13 - p.100, L.11.) The Idaho Court of

Appeals described the contents of the interview in its opinion affirming Harrell's
conviction on direct appeal as follows:
During the interview, Harrell admitted to having sex with the
victim and stated that "everything was going good and then it
turned to shit." Harrell also stated that he didn't know how things
got out of hand, that he didn't realize that he hit her that hard, and
that he hated going to jail for something he didn't mean to do.
Following the interview, Harrell completed a written statement in
which he stated, "Everything was going good, and the next minute,
everything got out of hand, and she started telling me she didn't
want to. She wanted to go to bed, and that is when it got out of
control."
Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749, p.4.
On appeal, Harrell asserts his confession was false and that Detective
Kidd engaged in coercive interview techniques.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.)

However, filing an I.C. § 19-4902 post-conviction DNA petition does not provide
the petitioner the opportunity to re-litigate trial evidentiary issues. Harrell moved
for the suppression of the interview video and his written confession prior to trial,
but the district court denied the motion. (#25985, R., pp.21-24, 42-45.) Harrell
did not challenge the admissibility of his confessions on direct appeal.

See

The Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and
Reporter's Transcript filed in Harrell's direct appeal No. 25985, State v. Harrell.
(6/14/12 Order.)
10
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Harrell, 2001 Unpublished Opinion No. 749. For the purposes of the I.C. § 194902 materiality requirement, the appropriate analysis evaluates what evidence
was actually presented at trial.
Harrell's confessions were corroborated by trial witness testimony.
Witness Yvonne Vega testified that after meeting Harrell the night of the rape,
she observed a man - whom she identified as Harrell by his clothing - leave the
victim's house and quickly drive away in his truck with his headlights off.
(#25985 Trial Tr., p.175, L.3 - p.180, L.1; p.192, L.20 - p.195, L.3.)

Vega

knocked on the victim's locked front door for some time before Harrell emerged.
(#25985 Trial Tr, p.191, L.23 - p.192, L.19.)

Vega testified that immediately

thereafter, she discovered the victim inside the house, "naked, bloody and beat,"
and reporting that she had been raped. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.195, L.4 - p.197,
L.20.) Jennifer Nanez corroborated Vega's account, but testified that she could
not identify the man who fled the victim's house. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.252, L.25 p.257, L.1.)

Celest Christiansen testified that she met Harrell the night of the

rape, invited him to the victim's house, and became familiar with Harrell's truck
after asking him to move it. (#25985 Trial Tr. p.150, L.24 - p.164, L.20.) She
then testified that she saw Harrell's truck outside the victim's residence after she
and several others temporarily left. (Id.)
Detective Kidd testified that on the morning after the rape, he observed
"numerous scrapes and cuts," on Harrell's hands, "one of which was still
bleeding." (#25985 Trial Tr., p.103, L.8 - p.104, L.15.) Detective Kidd explained
that these wounds caught his attention because they were "very fresh," and
11

consistent with injuries one would sustain by hitting someone in the teeth. (Id.)
These injuries, and Detective Kidd's impression of them, were consistent with the
victim's description of the rape. (#25985 Trial Tr., p.41, L.14 - p.42, L.13.)
On appeal, Harrell finally contends that because "the scene of the rape
was bloody," the absence of the victim's blood on Harrell's underwear would
"show that [the rapist] was not Mr. Harrell." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, the
mere absence of detectable victim's blood from Harrell's underwear, more than
10 years after the rape, would have limited exculpatory value when weighed
against Harrell's confessions and other evidence of his guilt.

Harrell presented

no particular analysis or sworn expert testimony regarding the likelihood that the
victim's blood would be found on the rapist's underwear under the facts of this
case.
Harrell has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that
even assuming DNA test results favorable to Harrell, such results did not have
the scientific potential to produce new evidence showing that it was more
probable than not that Harrell was innocent of the rape. This Court may affirm
the district court's decision exclusively on this basis.

2.

Harrell Has Failed To Show That Additional DNA Testing On His
Underwear Would Be Exculpatory

While the district court chose to assume that the requested DNA testing
would be favorable to Harrell, the statute did not require it do so. Idaho Code §
19-4902 permits the court to consider the likelihood that the requested testing will

12

even result in exculpatory evidence, in determining whether the petitioner has
met the materiality requirement.
As discussed above, the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902
requires a petitioner to show that "the result of the testing has the scientific
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more
probable than not that the petitioner is innocent."

The plain language of this

statute does not expressly require the court to assume exculpatory test results. 3
If the Idaho legislature wished to remove the judicial determination of the
likelihood of exculpatory results, it could have done so.
In this case, previous DNA testing excluded Harrell as a source of the
apparent blood stains found on his underwear. (#25985 Trial Tr. p.227, L.18 p.235, L.8.) Harrell has not argued that this test result is open to modification by
new modern testing. The previous DNA testing also found that the victim shared

This distinguishes I.C. § 19-4902 from the corresponding post-conviction DNA
testing statutes of several other jurisdictions which do expressly require the
district court to assume exculpatory results when analyzing whether a petitioner
has made the required materiality showing. !;&_ Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1413(1 )(a) (a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a)
"Favorable results of the DNA testing will demonstrate the petitioner's actual
innocence"; Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 54-102kk(b)(1) (a court must order DNA testing if
petitioner shows "[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
through DNA testing"); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1 (c)(3)(ii) (petitioner must
present a prima facie case demonstrating that "DNA testing of the specific
evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish" actual innocence or
support a lesser sentence in a capital case); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035(7)(1)
(petitioner must show a "reasonable probability exists that the movant would not
have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through the
requested DNA testing" (emphasis added)); see also Ind. Code§ 35-38-7-8(4);
Ky. Rev. Stat.§ 422.285(5)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 176.0918(7)(a).
3
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a DNA profile with the blood found on Harrell's underwear, and that only 1 in
2,100 Caucasians share this profile. (Id.)
In light of this previous testing, Harrell cannot show a reasonable
probability that new DNA testing would even produce exculpatory results. Harrell
thus cannot meet the materiality requirement of I.C. § 19-4902, especially when
these previous results are considered in conjunction with the evidence of
Harrell's guilt presented at trial, and the fact that even favorable results would
merely reveal only the absence of incriminating evidence.
Idaho Code § 19-4902 does not require a district court to assume that the
results of the requested DNA testing would be exculpatory when analyzing
whether the petitioner has met the materiality requirement of that statute. In light
of the previous DNA testing on his underwear, Harrell could not show a
reasonable probability that new DNA testing would have a different result. This is
a relevant factor in determining whether the results had "the scientific potential to
produce new, noncumulative evidence that would show that it is more probable
than not that [Harrell] is innocent." This Court can affirm on this alternative basis.
CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
dismissal of Harrell's petition for post-conviction DNA testing.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2013.

'
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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